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edged. 1 Introduction
A growing number of recent studies using plant-level data ﬁnd a large degree of heterogeneity
in the size, productivity, and growth patterns of manufacturing plants.1 In this paper, we
explore the implications of this plant-level heterogeneity for macroeconomic dynamics and
policy.
We ﬁrst document the heterogeneity of U.S. manufacturing plants, using the Annual
Survey of Manufactures (ASM) from the U.S. Census Bureau from 1972–1997. While previ-
ous studies on the entry and exit of producers document considerable ﬂuctuations in entry
and exit rates (e.g., Chaterjee and Cooper, 1993; Campbell, 1998), relatively little is known
about how the characteristics of entering and exiting plants vary over the business cycle.
We document patterns of entry and exit over the business cycle in terms of entry and exit
rates, employment, and productivity. We ﬁnd that entry rates diﬀer signiﬁcantly in booms
and recessions. In particular, plants entering in booms are very diﬀerent in terms of pro-
ductivity and employment from those entering in recessions, but plants that exit in booms
and recessions do not diﬀer much. For example, the average employment of entering plants
in recessions and their relative size (compared to incumbents) is larger than entering plants
in booms. Moreover, the relative productivity of entering plants is also higher in recessions
than in booms. Such diﬀerences are relatively small for plants exiting in booms or recessions.
It has long been argued that recessions have “cleansing” eﬀects: low-productivity plants
are scrapped during recessions, enhancing aggregate eﬃciency. Many recent papers have
suggested alternative views about what is happening in recessions. For example, analyzing a
model of creation and destruction of production units, Caballero and Hammour (1994) argue
that low-productivity ﬁrms can be “insulated” from recessions because fewer new plants are
created during recessions. Barlevy (2002) considers a model of on-the-job search and shows
that recessions may reduce aggregate eﬃciency by discouraging the reallocation of workers.
In a more recent study, Caballero and Hammour (2005) provide evidence that recessions
1See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a review of the literature.
2reduce the amount of cumulative reallocation in the economy.
Focusing on permanent shutdowns, we do not ﬁnd strong eﬀects of cleansing during
recessions. Overall, annual exit rates are similar across booms and recessions. Further-
more, exiting plants in recessions are not very diﬀerent from those in booms in terms of
employment or productivity. Our ﬁnding suggests that recessions do not necessarily cause
productive plants—those that could have survived in good times—to shut down in large
numbers. Rather, strongly procyclical entry rates suggest that the “insulation” eﬀect at
the entry margin predominates. In contrast to exiting plants, entrants vary substantially in
terms of average size and productivity during the business cycle. Only highly productive
plants enter and begin production during recessions. While previous studies on the eﬀects of
recessions have focused on selection at the exit (or destruction) margin, our ﬁnding suggests
that selection at the entry (or creation) margin may be more important.
Based on our observations of heterogenous plant-level behavior during business cycles, we
build a dynamic general equilibrium model and use it to analyze the eﬀects of macroeconomic
policies. Our model extends the standard general equilibrium ﬁrm dynamics model of Hopen-
hayn and Rogerson (1993) by incorporating aggregate productivity shocks. To account for
entrants’ productivity diﬀerences in booms and recessions, we also incorporate self-selection
during the entry process. We ﬁnd that the model performs well in replicating the cyclical-
ity of entry and exit rates. However, it is necessary to assume cyclicality of entry costs to
account for the cyclical patterns of selection in the entry process. When entry costs are
acyclical, the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on entrants’ size and productivity is al-
most completely oﬀset by the general equilibrium eﬀect (cyclical changes in wages). That is,
while the increase in aggregate productivity makes entry attractive even for low-productivity
plants, this eﬀect is completely washed out by the increase in wages. When we assume a
suﬃcient amount of cyclicality in entry costs, the model can account for the observed cyclical
plant-level dynamics.
Some other recent papers extend a similar style of a ﬁrm dynamics model to incorporate
3business cycles. The main diﬀerence between this paper’s model and those of the existing
literature is that in ours both entry and exit are endogenously determined. Veracierto (2002,
2004) was among the ﬁrst to incorporate aggregate productivity shocks to the Hopenhayn-
Rogerson style model.2 Veracierto (2002, 2004), however, assumes exogenous entry and
exit, and therefore his models are not directly suitable to explain the cyclical patterns of
entry and exit observed in the data. Comin and Gertler (2004) build a model with endoge-
nous innovation and technology adoption over the “medium-term” business cycle. In their
intermediate-goods sector, entry (innovation and adoption) is endogenous but exit (obso-
lescence of technology) is exogenous. In their ﬁnal-goods sector, proﬁt is a function of the
total number of ﬁrms, and the zero-proﬁt condition pins down the total number of ﬁrms in
equilibrium. Therefore, their ﬁnal-goods sector does not have separate gross ﬂows of entry
and exit.3 A recent work by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2006) also constructs a model
of business cycles with endogenous entry, but their model features ﬁrms with homogeneous
technology and exogenous exit.
Samaniego (2006) constructs a general equilibrium model of industry dynamics with en-
dogenous entry and exit. Instead of solving a model with aggregate shocks, he characterizes
the (deterministic) transition path after the change in aggregate productivity. He ﬁnds that
both entry and exit respond very little to the change in aggregate productivity. This contrasts
with our result—in our model, the entry rate responds strongly to an aggregate productiv-
ity shock. A large part of the diﬀerence comes from the speciﬁcation of the entry cost.
Samaniego assumes that the marginal cost of building a plant is increasing in the number of
existing plants, while we assume a constant marginal cost. Our empirical evidence suggests
that the constant marginal cost speciﬁcation achieves an outcome closer to the behavior of
U.S. manufacturing plants.
2As in Veracierto (2001), the models in Veracierto (2002, 2004) also incorporate saving and the capital
stock, which are absent in our model.
3Similarly, in other papers that employ monopolistic competition models to explore markup dynamics
(e.g., Chatterjee and Cooper, 1993; Devereux, Head, and Lapham, 1996; and Jaimovich, 2007), the zero-proﬁt
condition in each period determines the total number of ﬁrms, so that it is not possible to address the issues
of gross entry and exit separately.
4Utilizing our model, we conduct four policy experiments. The ﬁrst two analyze the ﬁring
tax. As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), a constant ﬁring tax reduces the average level
of employment. Interestingly, a constant ﬁring tax increases the variance of output. This
contrasts with the stabilizing eﬀects of ﬁring taxes in models with exogenous entry and
exit (e.g., Veracierto, 2004)—thus, it is in fact important for policy analysis to model entry
and exit behavior endogenously. The reason a constant ﬁring tax is destabilizing is that
the entry rate becomes more volatile when this tax is imposed. Given the mean-reverting
nature of the idiosyncratic productivity process, the ﬁring tax has a greater impact on large
plants because they are more likely to contract in the near future. Since entrants are larger
during recessions than during booms, the eﬀect of ﬁring taxes on entrants is stronger during
recessions. Therefore, the diﬀerence between entry rates during booms and entry rates during
recessions widens due to the ﬁring tax.
We next consider a countercyclical ﬁring tax that is intended to reduce the amount of
ﬁring during recessions. When a ﬁring tax is imposed only during recessions, job destruction
rates during recessions are reduced. However, the variance of output increases dramatically.
Experiments three and four analyze entry subsidies. In both experiments, subsidizing
entry costs during recessions stabilizes both the entry rate and aggregate output.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we document the empirical facts
on entry, exit, and employment in U.S. manufacturing. In Section 3, we build a general
equilibrium model of plant-level dynamics and match it to the data. In Section 4, we conduct
the policy analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence on employment and productivity dy-
namics
2.1 Measurement and data
We use the ASM portion (from 1972 through 1997) of the Longitudinal Research Database
(LRD), which is constructed by the U.S. Census Bureau, to analyze the behavior of plants
5during business cycles. Many recent theoretical studies on plant-level dynamics are based on
the evidence provided by Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988, 1989a, 1989b). They utilize
the Census of Manufacturers (CM) dataset, which is a part of the LRD. The CM is conducted
for the universe of U.S. manufacturing plants, and the evidence from the CM has been used to
calibrate stationary equilibrium models describing the entry, exit, and employment dynamics
of U.S. plants (e.g., Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993). However, because the CM is conducted
every ﬁve years, it is not suitable for describing plant-level behavior over the business cycle.
The ASM, conducted annually for non-census years, overcomes this issue. The ASM utilizes
a probability-based sample of plants drawn from the universe of plants identiﬁed by the
CM. We use ASM sample weights so that the sample is representative of the entire U.S.
manufacturing sector.4
In this study, entering plants are new plants, which appear in the ASM or CM for the
ﬁrst time with at least one employee (birth). Similarly, exiting plants include only permanent
shutdowns (death). We do not include temporary exit and re-entry of plants, in order to
exclude possible spurious entries and exits in the ASM panels (See Appendix A for more
detail about measuring entry and exit). As discussed in detail in Davis, Haltiwanger, and
Schuh (1996), samples in the ASM panels are rotated every ﬁve years. Only large “certainty”
plants are continuously observed across diﬀerent ASM panels. In order to avoid measurement
errors in entry and exit that are caused by the panel rotations, the results reported in this
paper exclude entries and exits measured between two diﬀerent ASM panels, namely for the
years 1973-74, 1978-79, 1983-84, 1988-89, and 1993-94.
In addition to employment dynamics, we also examine the extent to which the produc-
tivity of entering and exiting plants varies over the business cycle. The ASM contains data
on material inputs, output, and the capital stock in addition to employment at each plant.
We construct various measures of productivity.
First we look at total factor productivity (TFP), as in the standard macroeconomic
4See Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for details about the data.
6growth-accounting analysis. Our plant-level TFP closely follows Baily, Hulten, and Campbell






t , where yt is real gross
output, st is TFP, kt is real capital stock, nt is labor input, and mt is real material inputs,
the TFP (st) can be measured from
ln(st) = ln(yt) − αk ln(kt) − αn ln(nt) − αm ln(mt). (1)
We measure factor elasticities using 4-digit industry-level revenue shares. Real capital stocks
are obtained from the perpetual inventory method. Output and material inputs are measured
in 1987 constant dollars using deﬂators from the NBER manufacturing productivity dataset.
Labor input is measured as total hours for production and non-production workers following
Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992). Appendix A describes the construction of our measures
in more detail.
While this measure of TFP follows the practice used in the literature for measuring plant-
level TFP, it may be subject to measurement errors of the capital stock. To avoid this issue,
we consider the following speciﬁcation, yt = stnθ
t. Now we measure yt by value added, rather
than output. Then st can be measured from
ln(st) = ln(yt) − θ ln(nt). (2)
We prefer this speciﬁcation for two reasons. First, the measurement of the capital stock
is likely to be less reliable than employment, and thus the measurement based on (1) may
suﬀer from large measurement errors. Second, our model in Sections 3 and 4 does not include
capital, and the measure of productivity by (2) directly matches our model speciﬁcation. The
value of st in the second measure represents both TFP’s and the capital stock’s contributions
to production.
5Without a proper measure of prices for individual plants, it is not possible to measure total factor produc-
tivity at the plant level. While we call this measure TFP, it is actually real revenue per unit input and reﬂects
within-industry price variation. See Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2007) for possible issues involved in
using revenue-based productivity measures.
7Continuing Entering Exiting
Average size 87.5 50.3 35.3
Relative size (to the industry average of continuing plants) – 0.60 0.49
Table 1: Average size of plants
Entering Exiting
TFP based on (1) 0.96 0.86
Labor productivity (using employment) 1.00 0.92
Labor productivity (using hours) 0.98 0.91
TFP based on (2) 0.75 0.65
Table 2: Average plant productivity
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Average statistics of employment and productivity
First, we document the characteristics of entering and exiting plants in terms of employment
and productivity. Those statistics are used to calibrate the steady state of the model. Table 1
documents the average size of the plants, in terms of the number of workers. Entering plants
(time-t size of the plants that entered between time t−1 and t) and exiting plants (time-t−1
size of the plants which exited between time t − 1 and t) are much smaller than continuing
plants (time-t size of the plants which survived from time t−1 to time t). Table 1 also reports
the relative size of entering and exiting plants. The relative size of an entering (exiting) plant
is obtained by dividing the size of the entrant by the average size of continuing plants in the
same four-digit industry.6 Entering plants are 40 percent smaller than continuing plants in
the same four-digit SIC industry, while exiting plants are about half of the size of continuing
plants in the same industry.
These diﬀerences in size are partly explained by diﬀerences in productivity. Table 2
shows various measures of relative productivity. This ﬁnding is one of the contributions of
6By dividing by the average size of continuing plants in the same four-digit industry, we control for the
eﬀects of changes in the industrial composition of entrants over the cycle, as well as diﬀerences in plant size
across industries.
8our paper, since in the previous literature direct measures of productivity were not available
at an annual frequency. Each cell in Table 2 represents the relative productivity (compared
to the four-digit SIC industry average of continuing plants) of entering and exiting plants.
Two properties are found consistently across diﬀerent productivity measures. First, entering
and exiting plants are less productive than continuing plants (except for one case).7 Second,
exiting plants are less productive than entering plants. These ﬁndings are consistent with
the pattern of employment size in Table 1, provided that a productive plant employs more
workers.
The ﬁrst row in Table 2 is the TFP, based on (1). The second and third rows are measures
of labor productivity (output divided by labor input). The second row measures labor input
by employment, and the third row measures labor input by hours. The last row is the
productivity measure based on equation (2). Here, instead of using (2) directly, we control
for industry heterogeneity in labor shares by postulating the production function yt = stn
θI
t .
We obtain st by calculating ln(st) = ln(yt)−θI ln(nt). θI is obtained from the four-digit SIC
industry-level labor share. As is discussed above, the advantage of the measure based on (2)
is that the measurements of output and employment are relatively more reliable than capital
and material inputs. Moreover, we use this exact form of production function in Sections
3 and 4. Therefore, we mainly utilize this last measure of productivity in calibrating the
model.
In measuring the process of plant-level employment, we estimate an AR(1) process
ln(nt+1) = α + ρln(nt) + εt+1, (3)
where εt+1 ∼ N(0,σ2). We report estimates of the AR(1) process of employment dynamics
in Table 3. Since only large plants are observed across two diﬀerent ASM panels, the results
7Diﬀerences in plant-level productivity must be interpreted with caution. Because plant-level prices are
not observed, our revenue-based productivity measures reﬂect price or demand variation within an industry
in addition to diﬀerences in technical eﬃciency. In studies focusing on a small number of industries where
producer-level prices and quantities are observed separately, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2007) ar-
gue that the true technological productivity of entrants may be understated when traditional revenue-based
measures are used because new plants have lower prices than incumbents.
9ρ σ
Without any control 0.97 0.40
With year dummy 0.97 0.40
With year dummy, age, industry 0.97 0.39
Table 3: Employment dynamics
1 - 19 20 - 49 50 - 99 100 - 249 250 +
plants 0.457 0.239 0.131 0.106 0.067
employment 0.049 0.090 0.109 0.194 0.559
hiring 0.082 0.120 0.131 0.207 0.460
ﬁring 0.142 0.143 0.135 0.195 0.385
exit rate 0.080 0.039 0.031 0.025 0.015
plants, by age
Young 0.073 0.016 0.007 0.005 0.002
Middle 0.184 0.083 0.038 0.024 0.009
Old 0.200 0.140 0.087 0.078 0.055
employment, by age
Young 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.014
Middle 0.019 0.031 0.031 0.043 0.064
Old 0.023 0.053 0.072 0.142 0.480
Table 4: Size distribution of plants
exclude samples between two ASM panels in a way that is similar to our calculation of entry
and exit statistics. The estimated value of ρ is very close to one—the employment process is
very persistent. The results are similar when we correct the selection bias using the maximum
likelihood estimates from the Heckman selection model.8
Table 4 describes the distribution of plant size (employment). It also reports employment
shares, hiring shares, and ﬁring shares for each size class. It shows that employment is skewed
8We also calculated this process for the productivity measures in Table 2 and found a smaller ρ and a
bigger σ for the TFP based on (2). However, we are concerned with the bias due to measurement errors,
which will underestimate the coeﬃcient ρ (i.e., attenuation bias) and overestimate the variance of the residual,
σ. Given that we do not know the magnitude of the bias, we do not use the estimate for the productivity
process in the model. We utilize the employment statistics extensively, since we believe that they are least
subject to the measurement errors. See also ´ Abrah´ am and White (2007) for detailed discussions on AR(1)
process estimates of plant-level productivity.
10towards large plants. Hiring and ﬁring are also concentrated in large plants. While exit rates
are higher in smaller plants, some large plants also exit. As we will discuss later, previous
models such as Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) cannot explain this particular phenomenon.
Because productivity and size have a one-to-one relationship, very large plants have high
productivity levels and do not exit in their model. The distribution of plant size and the
employment shares are also presented for each age category.9 This presentation shows that
young plants tend to be small.
2.2.2 Business cycle patterns
Here we characterize how entry and exit, employment, and productivity diﬀer in booms and
recessions. When considering business cycles, we divide the sample years into two categories,
good and bad, based on the growth rate of manufacturing output. If the growth rate of
manufacturing output from year t − 1 to t is above average, we call year t a good year; if
it is below average, we call year t a bad year.10 The reason we base our distinction on the
growth rate rather than the level is twofold. First, the division based on the (HP-ﬁltered)
level does not match the conventional boom-recession division. For example, based on the
level criterion, 1990 (the only year in the 1990s where more than half of one year is recorded
as a “contraction,” according to NBER business cycle dates) is considered a good year, while
most years of the mid-1990s are considered bad. Second, we consider the growth rate to be
an important indicator since our analysis stresses the cyclical movement of entry and exit
rates, which are more related to the “change” than the “level.” 11
9The age categories follow Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p.225). In the ASM, panel rotation makes
it impossible to determine the exact age of plants. Roughly speaking, “Young” corresponds to 0–1 years in
operation,“Middle” corresponds to 2–10 years, and “Old” corresponds to more than 11 years.
10Good years are 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 83, 87, 88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and bad years are 74, 75, 79, 80, 81,
82, 84, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91.
11Later we utilize a business-cycle model with two levels of aggregate productivity. It turns out that signif-
icant positive/negative growth is realized only when the state switches between diﬀerent levels of aggregate
productivity. We mainly report the result based on the diﬀerent aggregate productivities, but we will also
report the results based on these “switching states” in Appendix D. The results are qualitatively similar. The
quantitative diﬀerences between booms and recessions are larger when we consider only the switching periods.
We view this as a result of having only two levels of productivity—the switch between states is more extreme
compared to reality.
11Good Bad Total average
Entry (birth) 8.1% 3.4% 6.2%
Exit (death) 5.8% 5.1% 5.5%
Table 5: Entry and exit rates
Good Bad Total average
Job creation from startups 1.76 1.21 1.52
Job creation from continuers 8.20 6.48 7.44
Job destruction from shutdowns 2.52 2.27 2.41
Job destruction from continuers 6.72 8.74 7.61
Table 6: Job creation and job destruction
Table 5 displays the entry and exit rates of plants in good and bad times. The entry rate
is much higher in booms than in recessions. In contrast, exit rates are similar throughout
the business cycle. The simple correlation between entry rates and the annual growth rates
of manufacturing output is 0.413, while the same statistic for the exit rates is 0.240. Our
ﬁnding that the plant entry rate is more cyclical than the plant exit rate contrasts with
the previous ﬁndings on the cyclical pattern of job creation and destruction (e.g., Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996; Campbell, 1998). Focusing on employment ﬂows, Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) ﬁnd that the job destruction rate is more cyclical than the
job creation rate. Using the aggregate job ﬂows data from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996), Campbell (1998) ﬁnds that employment-weighted entry rates are procyclical, while
employment-weighted exit rates are countercyclical. This diﬀerence can be explained by the
following three facts. First, the sample period between those studies and ours is diﬀerent.
These previous studies cover 1972–1988 and our study includes more recent cohorts of the
data and covers 1972–1997. In a recent study, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Kim (2006) ﬁnd that
job creation and destruction trends in the latest panel (1994–1998) are very diﬀerent than the
earlier period. Second, we focus on only ﬁrst-time plant openings (births) and permanent
shutdowns (deaths), whereas Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and Campbell (1998)
12Good Bad Total average
Average size 85.4 89.5 87.5
Table 7: Average employment of continuing plants
Good Bad Average
Average size, entering 45.1 59.2 50.3
Average size, exiting 34.9 35.9 35.3
Relative size, entering 0.53 0.70 0.60
Relative size, exiting 0.50 0.46 0.49
Table 8: Average employment of entering and exiting plants
also count reopened plants and temporary shutdowns as entries and exits. Finally, while
our study focuses on the entry and exit margin, the time series pattern for gross job ﬂows
can be driven by job creation and destruction from continuing plants. We also analyze
job creation (destruction) due to startups (shutdowns) and job creation (destruction) for
continuing plants separately. Table 6 presents job creation and job destruction statistics
calculated from the published job ﬂows data for our sample period (1972–1997).12 We ﬁnd
that job creation from startups is much higher during booms, while job destruction from
shutdowns is only slightly higher. The simple correlation between the job creation rate due
to startups and the percentage change in manufacturing output (annual) is 0.368, while the
simple correlation between the job destruction rate due to shutdowns and the percentage
change in manufacturing output is −0.006. Although the job destruction rate for continuing
plants is higher during recessions, we do not see the “cleansing” eﬀect in the exit margin
during recessions. This ﬁnding suggests that adjustment over the business cycle at the entry
margin may be more important.
Tables 7 and 8 describe average plant size during booms and recessions. In general, the
12The job ﬂows data are available from the webpage of John Haltiwanger,
http://www.econ.umd.edu/~haltiwan/download.htm. While quarterly job ﬂows data are also available, we
choose to use annual job creation and destruction rates because our statistics are measured in annual frequency.
Annual job ﬂows data are measured based on all employees (total employment), but quarterly job ﬂows data
include only production workers.
13Good Bad Total average
Relative productivity, entering 0.69 0.85 0.75
Relative productivity, exiting 0.65 0.65 0.65
Table 9: Productivity relative to continuing plants
average size is larger during recessions. Exiting plants are of similar size across booms and
recessions, but the average size of entering plants dramatically changes during recessions.13
Compared to entering plants in booms, entering plants in recessions start with about 30%
more workers. The simple correlation between the relative size of exiting plants and the
percentage change in manufacturing output is 0.034, while the simple correlation between
the relative size of entering plants and the percentage change in manufacturing output is
−0.241.
Relative productivity, presented in Table 9, exhibits a similar pattern. The relative pro-
ductivity of exiting plants is similar across booms and recessions, while the relative produc-
tivity of entering plants is substantially diﬀerent in the two phases of the cycle. The relative
productivity of entering plants in recessions are about 20% higher than that of entering plants
in booms.14 The simple correlation between the relative productivity of exiting plants and
the percentage change in manufacturing output is −0.054, while the simple correlation be-
tween the relative size of entering plants and the percentage change in manufacturing output
is −0.232.
13There were some outliers among entering plants in 1980. Because dropping a few outliers would cause
some disclosure issues, we chose to drop the whole year when calculating the average size and productivity
of entering plants in Tables 8 and 9. Because those outliers have substantially higher productivity levels,
including them results in a much greater diﬀerence in entrants’ productivity in booms and recessions, adding
support to our ﬁnding. Although the results on average employment do not vary much with or without the
outliers, we also dropped this year in Table 8 for consistency. Since the statistics for exiting plants are not
aﬀected by the outliers, we include the 1980 observations in the calculation.
14Since we use revenue-based productivity measure, a caution is needed in interpreting the ﬁnding of higher
productivity for entering plants in recessions. While they can indeed be more productive than those entering
in booms, it is also possible that they have about the same productivity levels but just produce goods with
higher price. Given the substantial diﬀerence in the size, we believe the diﬀerences in the revenue-based
productivity measure would reﬂect diﬀerences in true productivity.
143 Model
In this section, we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of plant employment, entry,
and exit. We base our model on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), departing signiﬁcantly
from their baseline model in four respects.
First, we add aggregate shocks to the economy. This ingredient is essential in analyzing
the business cycle implications of the model.
Second, we assume that there is a positive (and stochastic) value of exiting. This modiﬁca-
tion is necessary for the model to match the exit pattern observed in the data. In Hopenhayn
and Rogerson’s model (in the benchmark case), plants compare the value of staying with the
value of exiting, which is zero. In their model, there is a threshold productivity, s∗: when
the productivity is higher than s∗, the plant stays; if the productivity is lower than s∗, the
plant exits. Since productivity and employment have a one-to-one relationship, it means
that the exit rate is 100% for plants that are smaller than a certain threshold and zero for
plants that are larger than the threshold. The data do not exhibit this type of pattern: even
large plants with more than 250 employees have an exit rate of over 1% (see Table 4 in the
previous section). Furthermore, with Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s formulation, an annual exit
rate of 5.5% (see Table 5) implies that only very unproductive and small plants exit, which
is at odds with the employment and productivity evidence in Tables 8 and 9.
Third, we consider entry in two steps—to enter, one ﬁrst has to pay some cost and come
up with an “idea.” Then, after observing the quality of the idea, one decides whether to
pay an additional cost to actually enter the market. This “two-step” process introduces the
endogenous selection of the entering plants.15 In the data, we observe that the productivity
of entering plants is very diﬀerent across booms and recessions (see Table 9). In Hopenhayn
and Rogerson’s model, the entering plants receive a productivity draw after the decision to
enter, so that the productivity distribution of entrants in the economy is always the same and
is given exogenously. Our modiﬁcation makes it possible for the productivity distribution of
15Melitz (2003) employs a similar selection process in entry.
15entrants to vary endogenously across booms and recessions.
Finally, we introduce the cost of adjusting employment. The estimation of the employ-
ment process by Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004) strongly indicates that there are
important adjustment costs in the employment process. It turns out that adding a moderate
amount of adjustment cost dramatically changes the amount of job reallocation.
3.1 Plants
The model consists of two kinds of entities: plants and consumers. Plants use labor to
produce output. Consumers own plants, supply labor, and consume. There is only one type
of good, which is used for entry costs and consumption; we use it as the numeraire. In our
model, the only price we have to keep track of is the wage of the workers. We assume that
the plants have to pay adjustment costs and the ﬁring tax when labor input is adjusted. The
speciﬁcs of the adjustment costs and the ﬁring tax are explained later.
Here, we describe the decision of the plants. First, we outline the behavior of the incum-
bent plants. Then we illustrate the entrant’s behavior.
The timing of events for an incumbent plant at period t is as follows. In the beginning
of the period, all plants observe the current aggregate state, zt. An incumbent plant starts
a period with the individual state (st−1,nt−1). st−1 is the individual plant’s productivity
level at period t − 1. nt−1 is the employment level at period t − 1. The value function of
a plant at this stage is denoted as W(st−1,nt−1;zt). Then, it observes its (stochastic) exit
value, xt. Here, xt can be interpreted as the scrap value of its capital (and owned land),
although we do not explicitly model capital stock or land.16 After observing the exit value,
the plant decides whether to stay or exit. If it exits, it has to pay the ﬁring tax, since it has to
adjust the employment level from nt−1 to zero. If it decides to stay, it observes this period’s
individual productivity (idiosyncratic shock), st. The value function at this point is denoted
as V c(st,nt−1;zt). Then it decides the amount of employment in the current period, nt, and
16The entry cost that is introduced later can be interpreted as (partially sunk) investment in new capital
and land.
16produces. The production function is ztf(nt,st), where the function f(nt,st) is increasing
and concave in nt. If nt  = nt−1, it pays adjustment costs (and a ﬁring tax, if nt < nt−1).17
This concludes the period.
The timing for entrants is as follows. In the beginning of the period, everyone observes zt.
To enter, the ﬁrst step is to come up with an “idea.” To come up with an idea, one has to pay
cq and receive a random number qt (quality of the idea). A large qt indicates that productivity
after the entry is high. We call the people with an idea “potential entrants.” We denote the
expected value of having an idea, before knowing qt as V p(zt). We denote the value of a
potential entrant after paying cq and receiving qt as V e(qt;zt). Given qt, a potential entrant
decides whether to enter. To enter, the entry cost ce is paid. We interpret ce as (partially
sunk) investment in plants. The potential entrant, therefore, compares V e(qt;zt) and ce.
From here, the decision is the same as for the incumbent, except that the productivity st will
depend on qt instead of st−1. The plant observes st (its value function is V c(st,0;zt) now),
then it decides the employment nt, pays the adjustment cost, and produces.
An incumbent’s value at the beginning of the period is described by the Bellman equation
W(st−1,nt−1;zt) =
Z
max Es[V c(st,nt−1;zt)|st−1],xt − g(0,nt−1) dξ(xt).
Here, g(nt,nt−1) is the ﬁring tax. In the max  ,  , the plant compares the value of staying
(the ﬁrst term) and exiting (the second term). Es[ |st−1] denotes the expectation regarding
st, conditional on st−1. We assume that the exit value xt follows an i.i.d. distribution ξ(xt),
and that the exit value distribution does not vary over the business cycle. As we will see
later, our model can match the exit pattern in the data without relying on the cyclical exit
values. Es[V c(st,nt−1;zt)|st−1] is the expected value of a continuing plant V c(st,nt−1;zt),




17The details of the adjustment cost are explained later.
17where
V c(st,nt−1;zt) = max V a(st,nt−1;zt),V n(st,nt−1;zt) ,
and ψ(st|st−1) is the distribution of st given st−1. Here, V a(st,nt−1;zt) is the value function
when the plant adjusts employment, and V n(st,nt−1;zt) is the value function when it does
not adjust employment.
If the plant decides to adjust employment, the current period proﬁt is
πa(st,nt−1,nt;zt) ≡ λztf(nt,st) − wtnt − g(nt,nt−1),
where λ < 1 represents the “disruption cost” type of adjustment cost, emphasized by Cooper,
Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004). This represents the cost of slowing down the production
process when employment is adjusted. In Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis’s (2004) estima-
tion, this cost turns out to be the most important type of adjustment cost in explaining
employment dynamics observed at the plant level.
If the plant does not adjust employment, the current period proﬁt is
πn(st,nt−1;zt) ≡ ztf(nt−1,st) − wtnt−1.
Therefore,




V n(st,nt−1;zt) = πn(st,nt−1;zt) + βEz[W(st,nt−1;zt+1)|zt].
Here, Ez[ |zt] takes the expectation regarding zt+1, conditional on zt.




where η(st|qt) is the distribution of st given qt. Only the potential entrant with high enough
qt will actually enter. There is a threshold value of qt, q∗
t, which is determined by
V e(q∗
t;zt) = ce. (4)
18A potential entrant will enter if and only if qt ≥ q∗
t. A potential entrant’s value function is
V p(zt) =
Z
max V e(qt;zt) − ce,0 dν(qt),
where ν(qt) is the distribution of ideas. We impose a free-entry condition for becoming a
potential entrant:
V p(zt) = cq. (5)
3.2 Consumers





βt[Ct + Av(1 − Lt)]
#
,
where v( ) is the increasing and concave utility function for leisure, Ct is the consumption
level, Lt is the employment level, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, and A is a parameter.
Here, for simplicity, we consider linear utility for consumption.18 This simpliﬁcation enables
us to discount the ﬁrm’s proﬁt by the discount factor β. Since we consider the adjustment of
Lt at the extensive margin, the appropriate interpretation of the v( ) function is that it is the
result of an aggregation of many consumers who have diﬀerent preferences over consumption
and leisure. The budget constraint in each period is:
Ct = wtLt + Πt + Rt, (6)
where wt is the wage rate, Πt is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, and Rt is the transfer from the government.
The government transfers the ﬁring tax to the consumer in a lump-sum manner every period.
We assume that there is no saving. The ﬁrst-order condition in each period is:
Av′(1 − Lt) = wt. (7)
18Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) assume a period utility function that is concave in consumption and
linear in leisure.
193.3 General equilibrium
First, consider a situation where zt is constant. We use the solution of this steady-state
situation for the purpose of calibration later. In this case, the deﬁnition of the stationary
equilibrium is similar to Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). In our model, the general equi-
librium can be summarized in the labor market.19 The free-entry condition (5) characterizes





where  (s′,n) is the stationary distribution of the plants with the state (s′,n) when we
assume that the mass of potential entry in each period is one. φ(s′,n) is the labor demand
for a plant with the state (s′,n). N is the actual mass of potential entry. If (5) is not met, N
becomes ∞ or 0. It results in Ld = ∞ or Ld = 0, which violates the labor-market equilibrium
condition. N can take a ﬁnite and positive number only if w = w∗, where w∗ satisﬁes the
free-entry condition (5).
The consumer’s ﬁrst-order condition (7) characterizes the labor supply side. The labor
demand side in eﬀect determines the wage level at w∗ (with the free-entry condition (5)).
Combined with the labor-supply curve (7), the equilibrium level of labor, L∗, is determined.
This labor-market equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. Once L∗ is determined, the equilibrium
level of N, N∗, is determined by (8).
When we introduce an aggregate shock, L∗ and N∗ move over time. The labor demand






it is the labor demand from incumbents at period t and Ld
et is the labor demand from
the entrant when the mass of potential entry is assumed to be one. The determination of
19In Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), the general equilibrium is determined in the goods market. The
diﬀerence in our model comes from the fact that we have a utility function that is linear in consumption and









Figure 1: Labor-market equilibrium
the equilibrium is similar: the free-entry condition (5) determines the wage, the labor-supply
equation (7) determines L, and the labor-demand equation (9) determines N.
Aggregate proﬁt is given by
Πt = Yt − wtLt − Rt − Ntcq − Mtce + Xt,
where Yt is aggregate output, Nt is the number of potential entrants, Mt is the number of
actual entrants, and Xt is the total value of exiting. Therefore, combining this with (6), in
equilibrium (where labor demand equals labor supply)
Ct = Yt − Ntcq − Mtce + Xt.
3.4 Calibration
Our strategy is to use the steady state of the model with constant z (we set z = 1) as
the benchmark for calibration, and to add the aggregate shocks later on. A large part of
our calibration is based on the statistics presented in Section 2. Following Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), we normalize the wage rate, w, in the benchmark to 1. As in Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993), the model exhibits a homogeneity property in the sense that given
21prices, all of the aggregate variables (quantities) are proportional to the number of potential
entrants, N. We pin down the benchmark value of N by setting aggregate employment, L,
to 0.6 (approximate employment rate in the U.S.). The value of A is backed out from (7)
and the fact that w = 1 and L = 0.6 in the benchmark. We set β = 0.94 and θ = 0.7.
The process for idiosyncratic productivity, s, is chosen so that the model generates the
employment process observed in the data (Table 3). First, the process is assumed to be




Then, this process is approximated by a Markov process using Tauchen’s (1986) method









s)]. The constant as is set so that the average value
of employment matches the data. ρs is set to 0.97. This will bring the value of ρ in equation
(3) to the empirical value of 0.97 in Table 3. σs is set so that the variance of the growth rate
of n is close to the empirical value of 0.14. The resulting values are as = 0.04 and σs = 0.11.
The adjustment factor λ is set at 0.983, following Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis
(2004).20 As mentioned above, Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis show that this form of
adjustment cost is empirically most relevant. In our model, including a large quadratic ad-
justment cost makes the size of entering plants unrealistically small, and a small quadratic
adjustment cost does not alter the quantitative predictions along other dimensions.
The exit value is assumed to be zero with probability x0. With probability (1 − x0), the
exit value is uniformly distributed over [0, ¯ x]. We set x0 and ¯ x so that the exit rate and
the size of the exiting plants are similar to the empirical values. We choose x0 = 0.9 and
¯ x = 2500. We assume the entry transition function to be identical to the transition function
20This is their point estimate with a small quadratic adjustment cost. Their point estimate for λ with
no other adjustment cost is 0.988. We prefer the former number since it produces a more reasonable job
reallocation rate.
22Data Model
Average size of continuing plants 87.5 87.6
Average size of entering plants 50.3 49.7
Average size of exiting plants 35.0 35.8
Entry rate 6.2% 5.4%
Exit rate 5.5% 5.4%
AR(1) coeﬃcient ρ for employment 0.97 0.97
Variance of growth rate for n 0.14 0.14
Job reallocation rate 19.4% 23.0%
Table 10: Data and model statistics in the steady-state
for the incumbents: η(s′|q) = ψ(s′|s). The entry costs, cq and ce, are backed out from the
model. Given the value function V c(s′,n), conditions (4) and (5) pin down the values of
cq and ce, given ν(q) and the equilibrium value of q∗ that we target. We assume that ν(q)
follows ν(q) = B exp(−q) over the lower part of the grids on s (B is the scale parameter to
make ν(q) sum up to one).21 We select the value of ce so that the target value of ln(q∗) is
0.5. As we see below, this choice of ν(q) and q∗ brings the size distribution of young plants
close to the data. In the benchmark, we set the ﬁring cost, g(n′,n), to zero. For the v( )
function, we use ln( ).
3.5 Steady-state results
First, we compute the model without aggregate shocks to establish the steady-state behavior
of the model. The details of the computation of the steady-state model are described in
Appendix B. Table 10 compares the output of our model to the data.22 Everything except
for the job reallocation rate is our “target” for calibration, and we can see that we are able
to get close to the empirical values. The job reallocation rate is also close to the value in the
data.23
21We set 200 grids on x and 25 grids on q. The results do not change when we increase the number of x
grids to 1000 or when we use interpolation to approximate the continuous x distribution.
22The job reallocation rate is taken from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, Table 2.1).














Table 12: Employment share by size class
The following tables evaluate the distributional performance of the model. Table 11 sum-
marizes the distribution of plant size by the fraction of plants in each size class. Overall, the
size distribution of the model matches the data quite well. Table 12 describes the employment
share by size class. It also exhibits a good match.
Since much of our focus is on entry and exit behavior, it is critical that the model’s
properties for entering and exiting plants match the data. Table 13 exhibits the distribution
of young plants in the model and the data, which are reasonably similar.24
3.6 Adding aggregate shocks
To analyze business cycles, we assume that zt ﬂuctuates between two values. Following the
standard calibration in the real business cycles tradition, we assume zt = 1.01 in good times
and zt = 0.99 in bad times. This results in a 1% standard deviation in zt. zt follows a
symmetric Markov process. We calibrate the transition probabilities so that the average
24The deﬁnition of young plants follow Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for the data. In the model,














Table 14: Exit rates for each size class
duration of each state is three years.
The computation turns out to be much simpler than standard heterogeneous-agent mod-
els, since the wage depends only on z. From this property, we can perform the optimization
by plants and determine w(z) without considering the labor-market equilibrium. After w(z)
is determined, the labor-market equilibrium determines the equilibrium quantities, in partic-
ular the mass of entrants, N. The details of the computation are in Appendix C.
The results of the model with aggregate shocks are summarized in Table 15. First,
notice that the wage ﬂuctuates substantially. While the cyclicality of wages is empirically
controversial, we follow Cooley and Prescott (1995) and consider wages to be procyclical
and to have a standard deviation of less than 1% (see their Table 1.1). In our model, a
procyclical wage is necessary to make employment procyclical. Figure 2 shows the labor
market equilibrium. For the equilibrium L to increase when the labor supply curve stays the
same, we need w to increase. Somewhat surprisingly, in Table 15, the equilibrium value of q∗
does not change with the change in z. It is because the eﬀect of z and the eﬀect of w oﬀset




Entry rate 6.7% 4.0%
Exit rate 5.3% 5.4%
Average size of all plants 84.6 86.5
Relative size of entrants 0.57 0.57
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.85 0.85
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84
Table 15: Results with aggregate shocks
Therefore q∗ goes down. However, since w goes up, the proﬁtablilty of entry goes down. It
turns out that these two eﬀects oﬀset each other almost exactly. Since q∗ is the same across
the two states, the plants that enter are similar across diﬀerent aggregate states. This is
reﬂected in the similar relative sizes and relative productivities of entrants. This pattern is
at odds with the data—as is shown in Section 2, the data show a strong cyclicality in the
selection of the entrants.
In the model, exiting plants compare the value of staying with the value of exiting when
making exit decisions. Since the exit value distribution is quite wide, a 1% diﬀerence in z
does not make a large diﬀerence for this comparison.25 Thus the exit rate and the size and
productivity of exiting plants are similar throughout the business cycle in Table 15. This ﬁts
well with the pattern we observe in the data.
The entry rate ﬂuctuates signiﬁcantly in Table 15, as we see in the data. The mechanism
here is simple: since the wage increases during booms, the average size of incumbent plants
shrinks (which we observe in the data). The labor that is released from the incumbents can
be hired by the entrants—thus, the entry rate goes up. Here, again, the procyclicality of
wages plays an important role.
25If the exit value is concentrated at some value and there are many “marginal” plants, it is possible that
these plants exit with a small change in z. Thus, it is important for this result that we choose the exit value











Figure 2: Labor-market equilibrium when z increases
Summarizing, we found that the model is successful in matching patterns in the data
in some respects. The two characteristics that are at odds with the data are the large
ﬂuctuations in wages and the lack of selection in entry. These two are linked in the sense
that if the wage ﬂuctuates less, we expect that some selection eﬀect will emerge.
How, then, can we reduce the ﬂuctuation of wages? To answer this question, it is useful
to ﬁrst consider why wages are so volatile in the model. As is argued above, the equilibrium
wage is determined from the free-entry condition (5), which equates the idea cost to the
present value of the proﬁt associated with coming up with an idea. If the idea cost stays the
same, the present value of the proﬁt has to stay the same. Since an increase in z will increase
the proﬁt, w has to increase to oﬀset the increase in the proﬁt.26
Therefore, it is possible to reduce the volatility of wages in the model by introducing
another force that counteracts the change in the proﬁt. In the benchmark model, we assume
26The following example shows that the wage has to increase by about 1.5% to oﬀset the 1% increase
in z. For simplicity, consider a one-period model without any adjustment cost. Let the proﬁt function be
π = zsn





wage is constant, when z increases by 1%, n has to increase by 3%. This will increase the proﬁt by 3%. If,
instead, z does not change and w increases by 1%, n has to decrease by 3%. The resulting decrease in proﬁt
is 2%. Thus, to keep π constant, a 1% increase in z has to be accompanied by a 1.5% increase in w.
27that the entry costs, ce and cq, are constant. If either ce or cq is procyclical, the ﬂuctuation
of wages will be smaller. In the following, we explain how changing the entry costs aﬀects
the aggregate performance of the model.
First, we consider a procyclical ce. Table 16 shows the result for the case where ce is
0.032% larger in booms and 0.032% smaller in recessions. Here, we change ce so that the
wage has roughly the same degree of variation as z. It is clear that even though the ﬂuctuation
in w is smaller, the selection eﬀect goes in the wrong direction: it is more diﬃcult for low-
productivity plants to enter during booms. This comes from the fact that ce has a direct eﬀect
on the selection process—a large ce makes the actual entry harder. In fact, empirical studies
on investment costs also suggest that ce may move in a countercyclical direction. Recall
that ce can be thought of as the cost of actual entry—in particular the sunk investment in
equipment and structures at entry. It is known that the price of investment goods tends to
be lower during booms (see Fisher, 2006), and this evidence suggests that ce may be lower
during booms. In terms of the model, this can be treated as an exogenous shock to the value
of ce, which is negatively correlated with the variation in z. Furthermore, ﬁnancial costs may
also depend on the aggregate state of the economy. If ﬁnancing new plants is more diﬃcult
during recessions, higher ﬁnancial costs will cause ce to rise during these periods. We do not
explicitly model the ﬁnancial intermediation process, but this may be an important factor
when we consider the role of ﬁnancial frictions for business cycle propagation.27
Now we turn to another mechanism, procyclical cq. The interpretation of cq is the “idea
cost.” In reality, it will come up as the cost of R&D to create new ideas (innovation). Idea
creation is a human capital intensive process. The cost of hiring a good inventor is particularly
higher during booms, partly because the wages for these workers are higher then.28 In
addition, there are more entries and idea creations during booms, and the idea creation
27See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997).
28The National Science Foundation (NSF) collects various data on R&D expenditures and costs. On average,
the cost per R&D scientist or engineer in companies performing R&D was about 8.6% higher during booms




Entry rate 6.1% 4.7%
Exit rate 5.3% 5.4%
Average size of all plants 85.2 85.9
Relative size of entrants 0.57 0.56
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.85 0.84
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84




Entry rate 6.0% 4.7%
Exit rate 5.3% 5.4%
Average size of all plants 85.3 85.9
Relative size of entrants 0.57 0.57
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.85 0.85
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84
Table 17: The case of a procyclical cq
process may suﬀer from decreasing returns (due to, for example, the “ﬁshing-out” eﬀect).29
Table 17 shows the result. Here, cq is 0.165% larger during booms and 0.165% smaller during
recessions. We can see that this generates a qualitatively successful result. The selection goes
in the right direction. However, it does not generate a selection eﬀect quantitatively large
enough to match the data.
How can we generate a stronger selection eﬀect? Notice that the change in ce has the
29In this paper, we do not explicitly consider this possibility, since modeling such an eﬀect requires making
cq a function of N, and eventually making w dependent on N. This will add a signiﬁcant computational





Entry rate 7.0% 3.9%
Exit rate 5.3% 5.5%
Average size of all plants 79.5 82.4
Relative size of entrants 0.48 0.69
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.78 0.94
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84
Table 18: The case of a countercyclical ce and procyclical cq
opposite eﬀect on selection. Then, a countercyclical ce would help to generate a larger
selection eﬀect. Furthermore, as argued above, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that
ce is in fact countercyclical. If we combine a countercyclical ce with a procyclical cq (which
will counteract the counterfactual wage eﬀect of a countercyclical ce), we may be able to
generate a larger selection eﬀect, since both a countercyclical ce and a procyclical cq make
the selection eﬀect work in the right direction.
Table 18 describes the result of an experiment where ce is 0.8% higher during recessions
and 0.8% lower during booms, and cq is 3.3% lower during recessions and 4.1% higher during
booms. This generates a large selection eﬀect, and the diﬀerences in the relative size and
productivity of entrants in booms and recessions is comparable to the data.
Figure 3 depicts a simulated sample path of aggregate output. We can see that most of
the changes in output occur during periods where the aggregate state switches. If we look
closely, however, there are nontrivial dynamics (although the magnitude is very small) within
each aggregate state. Figure 4 magniﬁes a part of Figure 3, by picking up on one boom. We
can see “hump-shaped” dynamics.30 Output increases in the period following switching, and
30Chang, Gomes, and Schorfheide (2002) analyze a propagation of shocks in U.S. business cycles and
obtain hump-shaped responses of output and hours in their vector autoregressions analysis. They argue that
the hump-shaped responses cannot be obtained by a standard real business cycles model, and suggest that
learning-by-doing can be an important propagation mechanism.
30then it starts to decline. Since L is constant for a given aggregate state z (the wage w
is a function of only z, and the labor supply curve does not shift), this movement comes
purely from the change in productivity. Since z is constant within each aggregate state, the
source of these dynamics is the change in the composition of the idiosyncratic productivity
at diﬀerent plants. Here, two eﬀects are at work. In general, an increase in the number of
plants for a given L increases average productivity, since a plant’s production function is
subject to decreasing returns to scale. Since the number of entrants is above average during
a boom, this increases the number of total plants, and average productivity increases. At the
same time, an entering plant is less productive than incumbents, particularly during a boom,
so the distribution of plants’ productivity worsens as new plants are added. It turns out
that, with our calibration, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates initially and the second eﬀect dominates
later on.31 Figure 5 shows that similar dynamics can be observed during recessions. The
magnitude of these responses is very small, so that these are likely to be dominated even by
a small aggregate productivity shock if we allow for more than two levels of z. However, we
believe that it is an interesting theoretical possibility that the change in the distribution of
idiosyncratic productivity can serve as a propagation mechanism through entry and exit. In
particular, this mechanism would be relevant in sectors where entry and exit rates are large.
4 Policy implications
In this section, we explore the policy implications of our model, using the calibration with
countercyclical ce and procyclical cq. (In the following, we call the results in Table 18
our “benchmark.”) We consider four experiments. In three of these, we consider a cycli-
cal policy—a particular policy is imposed only during recessions. First, we consider a ﬁring
tax, which is constant over time (the tax revenue is given back to consumers in a lump-sum
manner, so it is counted in aggregate output). We consider the following speciﬁcation of the
31Interestingly, in the model with constant ce and cq (Table 15), the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates. This
means that the cyclicality of the entrants’ productivity is important in generating the hump-shaped dynamics.
















Figure 3: A sample path of aggregate output












Figure 4: A sample path of aggregate output (magniﬁed: a boom)












Figure 5: A sample path of aggregate output (magniﬁed: a recession)
ﬁring tax:
g(nt,nt−1) = τ max 0,nt−1 − nt .
We set τ = 0.1. Since the wage is set at 1 at the benchmark, this implies that the ﬁring
tax per person is 10% of an annual wage. Second, we impose this ﬁring tax only during
recessions. Third, entry is subsidized by 0.1% during recessions, in terms of both ce and cq.
Fourth, entry is subsidized by 0.5% during recessions, but only in terms of cq. The subsidies
are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes.
4.1 Constant ﬁring tax
The consequences of a ﬁring tax on the allocation of employment have been analyzed by many
researchers in recent years. For example, Veracierto (2004) analyzes the implications of a
constant ﬁring tax in a general equilibrium establishment-level dynamics model. Veracierto’s
model incorporates saving and the capital stock, but entry and exit are assumed to be
exogenous. Samaniego (2006) also conducts a similar exercise.
The results from our model with 10% ﬁring tax are shown in Table 19. Entry and




Entry rate 7.1% 3.8%
Exit rate 5.3% 5.5%
Average size of all plants 80.1 83.2
Relative size of entrants 0.46 0.66
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.77 0.94
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.83 0.83
Table 19: Results with a constant ﬁring tax (10%)
although we see some diﬀerences in the entry threshold, q∗, and in the entry rate. The average
size of plants increases, reﬂecting the reluctance to ﬁre. In terms of the average statistics, we
see changes we associated with the ﬁring costs. The job reallocation rate falls from 23.0%
(in the benchmark) to 21.3%. Average output falls by 0.9%, and average employment falls
by 0.7%.
Interestingly, the variance of output increases slightly, by 2.4%.32 This contrasts with
Veracierto (2004) and Samaniego (2006), who ﬁnd that the ﬁring cost is stabilizing. In our
experiment, the variance of output by survivors decreases with the ﬁring tax, as does the
variance of output by unit mass of entrants. However, the variance of the entry rate increases,
which leads to the increase in the variance of total output.33 Intuitively, the ﬁring tax is a tax
on relatively large plants, which are more likely to ﬁre in the near future. During recessions,
entering plants are typically larger than entering plants during booms, so they experience a
larger tax burden. This works in the direction of reducing the entry rate during recessions
relative to booms. This is reﬂected in the diﬀerence in q∗s between Table 18 and Table 19:
q∗ decreases in good times and increases in bad times. The general equilibrium eﬀects also
32The coeﬃcient of variation also increases, since the mean becomes smaller with the ﬁring cost.
33Veracierto does not have this margin, since the entry rate is assumed to be constant in his model.
Samaniego’s model features endogenous entry. However, in his model, the entry rate reacts very little to




Entry rate 9.1% 1.8%
Exit rate 5.3% 5.7%
Average size of all plants 73.1 80.6
Relative size of entrants 0.52 0.70
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.40
Relative productivity of entrants 0.80 0.97
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.83
Table 20: Results with a ﬁring tax, during recessions only (10%)
operate, but it turns out that, with our calibration, the entry rate increases with ﬁring costs
during booms and it decreases with ﬁring costs during recessions.
4.2 Firing taxes during recessions
Next, we consider the case where the government imposes the tax only during recessions, so
that it can reduce the amount of ﬁring during these times. The results are summarized in
Table 20. The government succeeds in its intention—the average job destruction rate during
recessions falls to 9.7% versus 11.6% in the benchmark. However, as we can see from the
table, the entry and exit rates ﬂuctuate more than in the benchmark, and the variance of
output more than doubles as a result.
4.3 Entry subsidies during recessions, both ce and cq
Looking at the data, the government might think that entry rates are too low during reces-
sions and decide to subsidize entry costs only during recessions. In our model, there are two
types of entry costs: the “idea cost” and the “implementation cost.” First consider the case
where both costs are subsidized at the same rate. A subsidy to the “idea cost” can be inter-
preted as an R&D subsidy, and a subsidy to the “implementation cost” can be interpreted as




Entry rate 6.1% 4.6%
Exit rate 5.4% 5.4%
Average size of all plants 81.6 83.1
Relative size of entrants 0.47 0.67
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.77 0.93
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84
Table 21: Results with entry subsidies on ce and cq only during recessions (0.1%)
compared to the benchmark. The variance of output is substantially reduced—it becomes
less than half of the variance found in the benchmark. The selection of entrants during re-
cession is not as stringent as in the benchmark: q∗ is smaller now. Since wage volatility is
also smaller, the average size of plants is also similar across booms and recessions. If the
government’s goal is to stabilize output along with entry and exit, this type of subsidy is
more eﬀective than the (cyclical or noncyclical) ﬁring cost.
4.4 Entry subsidies during recessions, only cq
Second, consider the case where only the “idea cost” is subsidized during recessions—in our
interpretation, this corresponds to an R&D subsidy. The results are in Table 22. Again, the
government can achieve stability in entry rates. The variance of output is also small—less
than half of the benchmark. The diﬀerence from the previous experiment is that here the
selection of entering plants is more stringent during recessions than in the benchmark.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores the business-cycle implications of plant-level dynamics, particularly the
entry and exit behavior of plants. First we documented patterns of plant entry, exit, employ-




Entry rate 5.9% 4.9%
Exit rate 5.4% 5.4%
Average size of all plants 82.6 83.5
Relative size of entrants 0.47 0.67
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.76 0.93
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84
Table 22: Results with entry subsidies on cq only during recessions (0.5%)
We found that the entry rate is much more cyclical than the exit rate, and entering plants’
average size and productivity vary signiﬁcantly over the business cycle. Then we constructed
a general equilibrium model of plant dynamics by extending Hopenhanyn and Rogerson’s
(1993) model. Our model accounts for the properties that we found in the data, when sev-
eral assumptions are made about the cyclicality of entry costs. We conducted several policy
experiments using our model. Both a constant ﬁring tax and a countercyclical ﬁring tax in-
crease the volatility of the entry rate and aggregate output. Countercyclical entry subsidies
stabilize the entry rate and aggregate output over the business cycle.
We found that a countercyclical “implementation cost” and a procyclical “idea cost” are
important in matching our model to the data. In this paper, we did not explicitly model
why these costs exhibit such cyclical patterns. An important research topic for the future
will be to uncover the nature of these costs theoretically (by modeling the microeconomic
foundations of these costs34) and empirically (by looking into the microeconomic process of
entry).
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our study focuses only on the U.S. manufacturing
sector. Investigating whether other U.S. industrial sectors or manufacturing sectors in other
34Explicitly modeling the limited enforceability of contracts, as in Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004),
is one possible direction.
37countries exhibit the same patterns is beyond the scope of this paper, but we believe that
these are also very important topics for future research.
38Appendix
A Data and measurement
A.1 Identifying entry and exit
In this paper, we focus on ﬁrst-time plant openings (i.e., birth) and permanent shutdowns
(i.e., death). The Census Bureau adds new plants from the Company Organization Survey
and the Business Register into the ASM panel. We identify startup and shutdown candidates
following Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). All startup plants should have at least one
employee, while plants with zero employees are considered to be shutdowns (either temporary
or permanent). We exclude reopened plants and temporary or indeﬁnite shutdowns using
the Census of Manufactures. In order to exclude spurious startup and shutdowns, we mainly
use information from the Census of Manufactures. While Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996) use the coverage code (CC), we ﬁnd the coverage code less useful for more recent
cohorts. We ﬁnd the number of startup and shutdown candidates with “CC= 0 (no change
in operations)” increases over time. Furthermore, even valid coverage codes are reported
with some leads and lags as compared to the timing of startup or shutdown.
It may be possible that the timing of birth in the ASM panel may be earlier or later
than actual birth due to the time lag in adding start-ups into the survey. While this may
cause a problem with statistics for an individual year (e.g., annual averages for entrants or
job creation from startups), it is less likely be a problem in our statistics on booms and
recessions because our classiﬁcation of booms and recessions has an average duration of 3
years. Because plants that enter during this multi-year window of recessions (e.g., recessions
between 1979-1983) are all counted as entrants during recessions, a lag of a year or two would
not alter our statistics substantially.
39A.2 Variables for productivity measures
This appendix documents how variables in the productivity measures used in this paper are
constructed.
Capital: We follow Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Troske (1997) closely in constructing the
capital stock. For the initial benchmark, we use the book value of structures or equipment,
deﬂated by the two-digit industry capital deﬂator from the BEA (2-digit). We use the average
of beginning-of-year assets and end-of-year assets. While we separately examine structures
and equipment, for recent years where the ASM reports only total assets (structures and
equipment together), the deﬂated book value of total assets is used as the initial benchmark.
Investment deﬂators are from the NBER manufacturing productivity database (Bartelsman
and Gray, 1996). The depreciation rate for each two-digit industry was also obtained from
the BEA. Real capital stocks are obtained by summing up the real value of structures and
the real value of equipment constructed from the perpetual inventory method.
Labor input: Labor input for TFP (based on (1)) is measured as total hours for produc-
tion and nonproduction workers. Because hours for nonproduction workers are not collected,
we estimate the value for total hours by following the method in Baily, Hulten, and Campbell
(1992), which is to multiply the total hours of production workers by the ratio of the total
payroll for all workers to the payroll for production workers. Following the model, we use
the total number of workers as labor input for the TFP based on (2).
Materials: Costs of materials are deﬂated by material deﬂators from the NBER manu-
facturing productivity database.
Output: For TFP, we use the total value of shipments (TV S) deﬂated by the shipments
deﬂator from the NBER manufacturing productivity database. Although it is possible to
adjust output for the change in inventories, inventories for some plants (in particular, for
small plants) are imputed (Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger, 2001). To avoid a possible
measurement issue, we have chosen to use gross shipments as a simple measure. For the
productivity based on (2), value added, deﬂated by shipment deﬂators, is used. We also used
40deﬂated shipments (TV S/PISHIP) minus the real value of materials, but the results did
not change much.
Revenue shares: We use 4-digit industry-level revenue shares as factor elasticities.
This procedure implicitly assumes that all plants in the industry operate with the same
production technology, a common assumption in studies measuring plant-level productivity.
In calculating labor’s share of total costs, we follow Bils and Chang (2000), magnifying each
four-digit industry’s wage and salary payments to reﬂect other labor payments, such as fringe
payments and employer FICA payments. We use information from the National Income and
Product Accounts to calculate the ratio of these other labor payments to wages and salaries
at the two-digit industry level.
B Computation of the steady state
This section outlines the computation of the model without aggregate shocks. We omit the
notation on z since it is constant here.
1. Set discrete grids on n and s. Set the Markov transition matrix for s. Set the distrib-
ution of the exit value x.
2. Optimization loop. Objects: W(s,n), V a(s′,n), V n(s′,n),V c(s′,n), Z(s,n), φa(s′,n),
φ(s′,n), ζ(s′,n), and χ(s,n). (These functions are deﬁned in the following.)
(a) Give the initial value for W(s,n), where s and n are the realizations in the last
period. This is the beginning-of-period value for an incumbent.
(b) Calculate V a(s′,n) and V n(s′,n) by
V a(s′,n) = max
n′ πa(s′,n,n′) + βW(s′,n′)
and
V n(s′,n) = πn(s′,n) + βW(s′,n),
41where
πa(s′,n,n′) = λzf(n′,s′) − wn′ − g(n′,n)
and
πn(s′,n) = zf(n,s′) − wn.
Record the decision rule of n′ when adjusted: φa(s′,n).
(c) Calculate V c(s′,n) by
V c(s′,n) = max V a(s′,n),V n(s′,n) .
Record the decision rule. ζ(s′,n) = 1 if adjust, and ζ(s′,n) = 0 if not. φ(s′,n) =
φa(s′,n) if ζ(s′,n) = 1 and φ(s′,n) = n if ζ(s′,n) = 0.




(e) Calculate W(s,n) by
W(s,n) =
Z
max Z(s,n),x − g(0,n) dξ(x).





(f) Update and repeat.





We can set the cut-oﬀ for q, q∗, and ﬁnd ce by
V e(q∗) = ce. (10)
42Then we ﬁnd V p by
V p =
Z
max V e(q) − ce,0 dν(q)
and ﬁnd cq by the free-entry condition:
Vp = cq. (11)
4. Calculate the stationary measure of plants (survivors from the last period plus this
period’s entrant, after receiving this period’s shock),  (s′,n), given N = 1. From linear
homogeneity, the actual measure of survivors will be N .





5. Obtain N by solving
Av′(1 − L(N)) = w. (12)
In the benchmark, we choose A so that L = 0.6 when w = 1. Thus, when v(x) = ln(x),










The total output can be calculated by:
Y (N) = N
Z
[zf(φ(s′,n),s′) − (1 − λ)ζ(s′,n)zf(φ(s′,n),s′)]d (s′,n).





43C Computation of the model with aggregate shocks
1. Set discrete grids on n and s. Set the Markov transition matrix for s. Set the distrib-
ution of the exit value x.
2. Guess w as a function of z.
3. Optimization loop. Objects: W(s,n;z), V a(s′,n;z), V n(s′,n;z),V c(s′,n;z), Z(s,n;z),
φa(s′,n;z), φ(s′,n;z), ζ(s′,n;z), and χ(s,n;z).
(a) Give the initial value for W(s,n;z), where s and n are the realizations in the last
period. This is the beginning-of-period value for an incumbent.
(b) Calculate V a(s′,n;z) and V n(s′,n;z) by
V a(s′,n;z) = max
n′ πa(s′,n,n′;z) + βEz′[W(s′,n′;z′)|z]
and
V n(s′,n;z) = πn(s′,n;z) + βEz′[W(s′,n;z′)|z],
where
πa(s′,n,n′;z) = λf(n′,s′,z) − w(z)n′ − g(n′,n)
and
πn(s′,n;w,z) = f(n,s′,z) − w(z)n.
Record the decision rule of n′ when adjusted: φa(s′,n;z).
(c) Calculate V c(s′,n;z) by
V c(s′,n;z) = max V a(s′,n;z),V n(s′,n;z) .
Record the decision rule. ζ(s′,n;z) = 1 if adjust, and ζ(s′,n;z) = 0 if not.
φ(s′,n;z) = φa(s′,n;z) if ζ(s′,n;z) = 1 and φ(s′,n;z) = n if ζ(s′,n;z) = 0.




44(e) Calculate W(s,n;z) by
W(s,n;z) =
Z
max Z(s,n;z),x − g(0,n) dξ(x).





(f) Update and repeat.





We can set the cut-oﬀ for q, q∗(z), and ﬁnd ce by V e(q∗;z) = ce(z).
Then we ﬁnd V p(z) by
V p(z) =
Z
max V e(q;z) − ce(z),0 dν(q).
5. Check if Vp(z) = cq is satisﬁed. If not, revise w(z). Repeat until convergence.
6. Simulation.
(a) Let δt(s,n) be the total measure of incumbents at the beginning of period t, before
entry and exit.
(b) After observing z, incumbents decide whether to exit. The measure of survivors
is
σt(s,n;z) = (1 − χ(s,n;z))δt(s,n).









(d) Thus the total measure is
 t(s′,n;z) = N̺t(s′;z) + ϑt(s′,n;z).
(e) We have to solve for N to actually calculate the total measure. The labor market





L is the sum of the incumbent’s employment Li, which can be calculated from
θt(s′,n;z), and the entrant’s employment, NLe, where Le can be calculated from
̺t(s′;z). Therefore,
N =
(w(z) − A)/w(z) − Li
Le .






D Results for signiﬁcant positive and negative growth states
In this appendix, we report the results of the experiments originally reported in Tables 15 to
18, when we use a diﬀerent categorization of good and bad times. Here, we categorize the
good times as the times when output growth rates are more than 0.1%, and the bad times as
the times when output growth rates are less than −0.1%.35 This is closer to the spirit of the
categorization in the data, which is based on the output growth rate. The main properties
of the results are unaltered from the main text, although the diﬀerence between good and




Entry rate 8.9% 1.7%
Exit rate 5.2% 5.6%
Average size of all plants 84.8 86.2
Relative size of entrants 0.56 0.58
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.85 0.85
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84




Entry rate 7.5% 3.1%
Exit rate 5.2% 5.5%
Average size of all plants 85.2 86.1
Relative size of entrants 0.57 0.57
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.85 0.85
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84
Table 24: The case of a procyclical ce
35We do not set zero as a threshold, so that we do not capture the small movements of output shown in




Entry rate 7.4% 3.3%
Exit rate 5.2% 5.5%
Average size of all plants 85.2 86.0
Relative size of entrants 0.57 0.57
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.85 0.85
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84




Entry rate 8.8% 2.6%
Exit rate 5.2% 5.6%
Average size of all plants 80.4 80.8
Relative size of entrants 0.47 0.71
Relative size of exiting plants 0.41 0.41
Relative productivity of entrants 0.77 0.95
Relative productivity of exiting plants 0.84 0.84
Table 26: The case of a countercyclical ce and procyclical cq
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